The Japan Times ジャパンタイムズ is usually one of the better newspapers around when it comes to analyzing what is going on in Taiwan, but today's editorial, "
Mr. Ma reaches out", was not up to the paper's usual standards. According to the JT's editors:
"Taiwan has a new president. Mr. Ma Ying-jeou, of the KMT (Nationalist) Party was inaugurated Monday after a decisive win in March's election. In his inaugural remarks, Mr. Ma hit the right notes, reaching out to both Taiwanese at home and Chinese 150 kilometers (93 miles) away across the Taiwan Strait. This is a historic opportunity to stabilize relations and establish a strong foundation for peace between Taiwan and the mainland. Will Beijing seize it?"
The question here concerns what "notes" Ma did or did not hit. The Japan Times states that Ma won the election because:
"Voters, tired of the ideological policies of former President Chen Shui-bian, have embraced the pragmatic, economics-first agenda promoted by Mr. Ma."
After commenting on the importance of closer economic cooperation between Taiwan and China, the editorial points out that:
"...Chen, and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), feared that increasing ties with the mainland would render Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese pressure. His government did its best to keep the two separate. For that effort..., Mr. Chen was labeled a 'splittist' whose attempts to promote Taiwanese national identity were considered by Beijing to be steps toward independence. The mainland's distrust of Mr. Chen grew throughout his administration and the Chinese government did its best to counter every Taiwanese initiative and humiliate Mr. Chen..."
So far, the editorial does an evenhanded job of clarifying the problems in the relationship between Chen and the Chinese government. From this point on, however, quality control begins to slacken:
"In his inaugural address, Mr. Ma spoke of a common Chinese heritage and, in a particularly bold gesture, he referred to three statements by Chinese President Hu Jintao on cross-strait relations — 'building mutual trust, shelving controversies, finding commonalities despite differences, and creating together a win-win solution.' Mr. Ma said Mr. Hu's 'views are very much in line with our own.' He also promised to negotiate on the basis of the '1992 consensus,' a slippery concept but one that Beijing insists upon."
From what I've read of the English translation of his speech, and from the analyses of several online bloggers here in Taiwan, Ma did more than just "speak" of a shared Han Chinese 漢民族 heritage, he practically reveled in it, while downplaying anything that makes Taiwan stand out from China proper. His references to the "1992 consensus" are also worrisome, as it isn't even clear that such an agreement actually exists. At least the Times is right in calling it "slippery". In fairness, Ma has never hidden his goal of reaching out to China, but the editorial doesn't raise any questions as to how far Ma is willing to go, and at what risk to Taiwan's sovereignty, in order to reach some kind of agreement or modus operandi with the Chinese (which, according to his speech, Ma is one of 1.5 billion or so). Instead, it states:
"The eventual success of (Ma's) entire platform depends, first and foremost, on forging a broad consensus in Taiwan that includes even those people who did not vote for him. Again, to his credit, the new president recognizes this. His speech included phrases in the local Taiwanese dialect as well as in Hakka and the aboriginal languages. He highlighted Taiwan's need for international space and 'respect.'"
What the Times failed to point out here is that, as far as I'm aware, Ma omitted any references to Taiwan's native population in his remarks, and one aboriginal legislator actually walked out of the speech in protest at this. And while Taiwan does need more "space" and "respect", we aren't informed that on the day before Ma's inauguration, China once again applied pressure on the World Health Organization to deny Taiwan any form of standing in that world body. But then, neither did Ma on Tuesday. The editorial then goes to point out other things from Ma's speech - no negotiations of unification during his presidential term, and the need for China to make progress on the democratic front, before pointing to China's positive response:
"The challenge now is to move beyond the rhetorical pats on the back and to substantive acts that reduce the risk of miscalculation and misperception in the Taiwan Strait and build genuine confidence between the two sides of the strait. The start of regular cross-strait charter flights is one such promising development; the expansion of tourism and lifting of limits on Taiwan investment on the mainland are others. As this process unfolds, the two governments may even be able to agree on a peace accord that stabilizes cross-strait relations and eliminates a regional flash point."
It's hard to disagree with this. After all, who doesn't want peaceful relations across the strait? If such an agreement is ever reached, however, would Ma put it to the voters of Taiwan first, or would he use the KMT's overwhelming majority in the legislature to ram it through, and then crack down on any dissent that may arise in the aftermath. After all, the KMT has had a lot of experience in that latter field. That, however, is a question that can't be answered here, and it is proper the Japan Times makes no mention of this in its editorial. What is missing, and it's a most puzzling omission at that, is that while Ma talked at length about common Chinese heritages and all that, and even briefly mentioned the United States in his speech, he said nothing at all about Japan. Zero, nada, not a word. I would have thought this would have caught the attention of the Japan Times, and led them to speculate on what that might mean to the future course of Japan-Taiwan relations, but the editorial staff chose not to take up this topic. Instead, it has been left to Max Hirsch of Kyōdō News 共同通信社 to point this out, in an excellent
article which can be found on the Thirsty Ghosts website:
There is also a second commentary in the Japan Times today on Ma's speech, "
Cross-strait opportunity" , by Ralph Cossa. Based on the theme of "be careful what you wish for", Cossa raises the interesting question:
"...can Beijing, after hearing "no" for the past eight years, now take "yes" for an answer."
Cossa is referring to the same conciliatory remarks Ma made in his inauguration speech that the JT editorial also spoke of:
"Ma laid out the normalization of economic and cultural relations with the mainland as immediate goals, but warned that 'Taiwan doesn't just want security and prosperity; it wants dignity.' Herein lies the rub! It should be relatively easy for Beijing to respond positively to Ma's calls for direct weekend charter flights and visits to Taiwan by mainland tourists and other economic and cultural exchanges. Some security gesture, such as a visible drawback of missiles opposite Taiwan, is also doable. But is Beijing prepared to make significant gestures aimed at improving Taiwan's sense of security and relieving its international isolation? A failure by Beijing to respond positively to Ma's olive branches will seriously undercut the new Taiwanese leader as he tries to build consensus at home in support of his forward-leaning cross-strait policies. His address is already being labeled by the opposition as 'naive' and 'wishful thinking.' Will Beijing prove this to be the case?"
Will it indeed. The Chinese government has a long history of clumsy handling of issues between it and Taiwan - will anything be different this time? Not if this is any indication:
"Beijing immediately opted to pass on its first chance to make a positive political gesture by once again blocking Taiwan's bid for observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO). Chen's decision to apply as 'Taiwan' rather than 'Chinese Taipei' regrettably made it easier for Beijing to once again block this request, but it could have asked the WHO to postpone consideration of Taiwan's bid for a few days to allow for a reformulation of the application, rather than quickly excluding it from the agenda. As a result, Beijing needs to quickly find some other venues to provide the dignity that Ma seeks and Taiwan richly deserves."
Cossa is no believer in Taiwanese self-determination judging from some of his past writings, but he does make some good observations here:
"It appears that Beijing is still struggling to figure out how to deal with a potentially friendly government in Taipei after years of just saying no to everything and branding every positive gesture by the Chen administration a 'splittist trick.' The real concern, as some Chinese candidly expressed to me during a recent visit to Beijing, is finding ways to improve Taiwan's 'international breathing space' without further enhancing its status as a sovereign independent entity. Fear that gestures once made would be exploited if Chen's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) returned to power were also cited as a reason for moving slowly, even though moving too slowly (or not at all) will increase the prospects of a DPP return."
Cossa then presents a long wish list of things Beijing could do:
1. "...it can observe Ma's call for a 'truce' in the international arena. In recent years, Beijing has taken great delight in humiliating the Chen administration by spiriting away Taiwan's few remaining allies, normally through a shameless bidding war. This must stop. If no one recognizes the Republic of China..., why shouldn't it just declare itself the Republic of Taiwan now and end the 'one China' charade?"
2. "A more dramatic military gesture is also needed. Merely withdrawing some easily redeployed mobile missiles is not enough. Beijing needs to deactivate and plow over some of the 1,000-plus missile sites it has poised opposite Taiwan as a true goodwill gesture."
3. "The semi-official cross-strait dialogue between Beijing's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taipei's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) also needs to resume, if for no other reason than to facilitate the institution of the economic 'three links' that both sides profess to support. Dialogue should also begin, either through ARATS-SEF or through a quasi-official 'track two' gathering, on cross-strait confidence building and conflict avoidance measures."
4. "Beijing also needs to loosen restrictions it has imposed on Taiwan in the WHO as a first step toward allowing Chinese Taipei to gain observer status as a 'health entity' next year."
and 5. "Beijing also needs to stop its heavy-handed pressure aimed at blocking participation by Taiwan scholars at academic gatherings and should take steps to help elevate Taiwan's status in the nongovernmental Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and other track-two organizations, while also supporting higher-level Taiwan participation in the APEC Leaders Meeting and other forums."
One question that Cossa doesn't ask, however, if whether Ma Ying-jeou will be the kind of leader who can move China to respond in ways that are beneficial to the overall benefit of Taiwan, and its 23 million citizens (including those who didn't vote for him). There is nothing to do now but sit back and watch the drama unfold!
