Amber and I in Taichū アンバーといっしょに台中へ行った

Sunday is the traditional day of rest, and so it was for my wife today. In order to give Pamela some time for herself, I took Amber on her first train ride, going from Fengyuan (Fongyuan) 豊原 to T'aichung (Taijhong) 台中. Actually, my daughter has been on the MRT 台北捷運 in T'aipei (Taibei) 台北, but today was still a first for her. We walked south from the station to the Taichung Central Mall, a shopping center that I hadn't been to since it first opened back in 2001. Father and daughter spent the afternoon checking out what was on each of the mall's floors, before heading down to the first basement level to have lunch. Afterwards, we met up with Steve and his family, and after spending some more time in the shopping center, the six of us walked back to the station. Steve wanted to give his kids a chance to take a train ride, so they rode with Amber and I back to Fengyuan, before returning to Taichung. Amber was pretty excited looking out of the train windows, so I'm looking forward to giving her more opportunities to ride the rails.

　

Amber on the platform at Taichung Station 娘は台中駅のホームにいる.

 

I was pleasantly surprised to find an outlet of Daisō ザ・ダイソー in the mall. Our apartment in Yokkaichi 四日市 was stocked to a large extent with things purchased from the local branch there of the 100-yen shop 100円ショップ chain, so seeing a Daisō here in Taichung brings back some memories. Instead of everything being 100 yen, however, in Taiwan Daisō is promoted as an NT39 store (39のSHOP). The photograph shows Amber happily polishing off a bowl of 茶碗蒸し ("savory egg custard") at the 回転寿司, or "conveyor-belt" sushi bar where we had lunch.

Amber had a great time with Zoey and Eli!

In the news ニュース

There was yet another article on Taiwan in the Japan Times ジャパンタイムズ today, and this one was a lot better than the tripe authored by Frank Ching. "Hope for pacifying the strait" is written by a former diplomat, Hisahiko Okazaki (and includes a lot of first-person references, as is common practice with Japanese commentaries). Okazaki finds optimism in a little-known remark that Chinese President Hu Jintao (Ko Kintō) 胡錦濤 made last fall in a report to the 17th National People's Congress 全国人民代表大会 of the Chinese Communist Party 中国共産党:

(Quote) "We would like to make a solemn appeal: On the basis of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides across the strait, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful development of the two sides and thus usher in a new phase of peace and development in cross-strait relations." (End Quote)

I'm not sure I see what the excitement is about, but Okazaki writes:

"From the moment I learned of this passage, I have considered it an important proposal."

Unlike Ching, Okazaki actually explains the reasoning behind his feelings:

"Taiwan has previously called on China to abandon the option of using armed force, but China rejected Taiwan's call. If a peace agreement as stated in Hu's report means renouncing the use of armed force, it is a landmark proposal and meets the Japanese and American policy goals of seeking a peaceful solution to the Taiwan Strait issue. Neither the reunification of two Chinas nor Taiwan's acceptance of 'one country, two systems' 一国二制度 is made a condition. The basis for talks is the 'one-China principle 一つの中国.' 'One China' is indeed the very basis of the Taiwan issue; at the same time it is a flexible concept."

Okazaki then discusses the groundbreaking dialog held between China and Taiwan in 1993, and how each side disagreed over whether or not Taiwan accepted Beijing's definition of the phrase "One China". Following this, he makes a very interesting suggestion:

"My conclusion is that if the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 民主進歩党 wins in the next presidential election, it would be good for Taiwan if it started negotiations with Beijing on the basis of Hu's proposal. Why the DPP? Negotiations with China over the question of 'one China' alone will be delicate, so I believe that those with strong principles about Taiwan's identity should engage in the negotiations. This does not mean I do not trust Ma Ying-jeou (Ba Eikyū) 馬英九 of the Kuomintang (Guomindang) 中国国民党. In fact, Ma reportedly stated that he does not favor reunification and that it is no problem that China and Taiwan have their respective interpretations of 'one China.' What Ma said, however, is different from what the Kuomintang has asserted in the past. And I also can't ignore the worry that a Kuomintang-led government may follow the lead of China."

Take that, Frank Ching! Just as it took someone with the anti-communist credentials of Richard Nixon リチャード・ニクソン to bring about a breakthrough in relations between the United States and China, Okazaki feels a DPP president is better placed to do the same for Taiwan, as unlike Ma and the KMT, he would be less likely to sell out the island to the mainland. Okazaki then continues on in the same vein:

"Although Hu declared the principle on which China-Taiwan talks should be based, China has yet to spell out the details due to complex domestic circumstances. It will do so but only after talking with Taiwan in the future and coordinating the views at home. Until then, China and Taiwan can be expected to engage in tough, fierce negotiations. Given this, I think it is necessary for a person with a strong belief in Taiwan's identity to engage in such talks. If the DPP negotiates with China, I don't think it would be a bad idea for Taiwan to come to terms with China over the term 'one China.' Taiwan can concede that both sides share a common heritage, at least by virtue of the fact that both use Chinese characters."

By a person who has a strong conception of Taiwan's identity, Okazaki sure as hell isn't referring to Ma Ying-jeou!

"Specifically, the best policy is that Taiwan add the condition that China must agree to Taiwan's membership in the United Nations 国際連合 in return for Taiwan conceding on the 'one China principle.' If that is realized, a number of principles stated in the U.N. Charter, such as sovereign equality, noninterference in internal affairs and a peaceful resolution of disputes, would become applicable. If that condition is set as an absolute condition, I would not care if someone backed by the Kuomintang assumed the post of Taiwanese president. It would be good if unnecessary conditions such as 'neutrality' or 'future reunification' were not added. In the case of Hong Kong, 'one country, two systems' has been introduced. Yet, no popular election has taken place in the 10 years since Hong Kong's reversion to China. Moreover, there are only 40 years left in which Hong Kong can enjoy a 'free society.'"

I don't share Okazaki's optimism on this issue (it's highly unlikely China would concede on the question of UN membership), but I think his views on the topic of Taiwan-China relations are very refreshing. He concludes by writing:

"Hu may be seeking to settle the cross-strait issue in a couple of years, thinking that it is inevitable that the Taiwanese public will become more Taiwan-oriented each year. Thus Taiwan could have the upper hand. Taiwan will not have to compromise at all on the issue of obtaining U.N. membership. If Hu is so insightful and has enough political power to be flexible in his political approach, East Asia could realize the dream of peace in the region after a half century of hostility."

Get this man and his columns some worldwide syndication!

ニュース＋日本語

Wow, three articles related to Taiwan in Friday's online editions of the Daily Yomiuri ザ・デイリー読売 and the Japan Times ジャパンタイムズ!

Up first is one of two articles that appeared in the DY on the threat Taiwan faces from China. Entitled "Military balance tilting toward China", it begins by stating:

"The military balance between China and Taiwan is turning in China's favor due to its huge defense spending that showed double-digit growth for the nine consecutive years from 1989. Taiwan is said to have superiority over China in maritime and air force strength. But China has built up its naval force remarkably in recent years."

After giving some numerical examples of Chinese superiority in certain types of naval vessels, as well as advances in fighter plane technology, the piece points out the following:

"China has deployed 1,328 ballistic missiles targeted at Taiwan, about seven times more than in 2000, when the administration of President Chen Sui-bian (Chin Suihen) 陳水扁 was inaugurated in Taiwan. Taiwan, on the other hand, has deployed only three sets of Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles (PAC-2) in the suburbs of Taipei and elsewhere."

You would think the Kuomintang (Guomindang) 中国国民党 would be up in arms (no pun intended) about this threat to the sovereignty of their beloved Republic of China 中華民国. But as those who follow political developments here know all too well:

"As a counterbalance to China's military arsenal, Taiwan's military wants to possess PAC-3 missiles, P-3C antisubmarine patrol planes and diesel-powered submarines, which the U.S. administration of President George W. Bush decided to sell to Taiwan in 2001. But the deals did not make any progress because deliberations on budgetary appropriations made little headway in Taiwan's parliament due to dissent by opposition parties."

It's getting worse, as the US is refusing to sell modified F-16 fighters to Taiwan because Washington:

"...has grown increasingly distrustful of the Chen administration."

Still, Taiwan remains a force to be reckoned with:

"As a deterrent to China, Taiwan has secretly developed a Hsiung Feng [Brave Wind] 2-E cruise missile with a range that covers Shanghai and Hong Kong. But Taipei has refrained from disclosing its deployment 'probably due to the pressure from Washington, which does not want to provoke Beijing because it is an offensive-type weapon,'..."

It's hard to reconcile the fact that my government remains silent on a seven-fold increase over the past eight years in offensive missiles deployed by an authoritarian dictatorship against a small island with a democratically elected leadership, while it warns the latter not to "provoke" the former. Taiwan is just one more issue for the Bush Administration to get things wrong on, I suppose. The article closes with a little bit of optimism:

"With Taiwan's presidential election set for March, however, China has not shown any sign of military threats against Taiwan in recent months. This is because Beijing learned a lesson...that such a provocation will draw criticism from voters in Taiwan and backfire in the election."

Yes, but what will happen after the election?

The Yomiuri also ran an interview with Taiwan's Vice Defense Minister, Ko Chen-heng ("Chinese naval moves worry Taiwan"), who:

"...expressed concern about China's recent expansion of submarine operations around Taiwan, a move that he said indicates China's apparent intention to make the strait an 'internal sea of China'...he also said China has been extending its maritime operations into the Pacific Ocean southeast of Taiwan. Ko stressed the need for Taiwan to deploy its self-developed cruise missiles to counter Chinese missiles."

On the military balance between China and Taiwan, Ko states:

"The balance is still in Taiwan's favor as far as our judgment is concerned. But it has become extremely difficult for us to procure arms because a number of countries have not sold us weapons due to Beijing's diplomatic pressure. Taiwan's fighter jets have become obsolete. Therefore, if the current situation continues, the military balance will turn in China's favor. The number of Chinese missiles deployed against Taiwan topped 1,300. Since China lacks capability to cruise across the Taiwan Strait 台湾海峡 for a landing operation, China intends to fire missiles in the political and economic nerve centers of Taiwan to cause social paralysis, thereby forcing us to surrender."

He also touches on the rationale behind the development of the Hsiung Feng IIE 雄風二E cruise missile:

"China has boosted its capabilities to prevent intervention by the U.S. military in times of emergency. Taiwan must wait for the arrival of U.S. troops to fight together. Therefore, it is essential to secure capabilities to make counterattacks on China's missile and radar bases as well as runways for military aircraft in order to buy time to delay China's invasion of Taiwan."

All in all, it's a short but frank discussion on the military security situation facing Taiwan.

The last article today comes from the Japan Times, and it's a bad one. "Kuomintang won't flaunt election win" is written by Frank Ching, a columnist based in Hong Kong whose writings also appear in the local, reactionary China Post newspaper. In true Ching fashion, he makes a bold statement, and then produces no evidence to back it up. On the recent legislative elections, he writes:

"The election transformed the situation from one where the opposition had a razor-thin majority in the Legislative Yuan 中華民国立法院, or Parliament, to where it has more than a two-thirds majority. Hence, as of Feb. 1, the opposition party can in theory pass whatever bills it desires. However, KMT party leaders are saying, wisely, that they will not abuse their power and will not seek to impeach President Chen Shui-bian, as they had repeatedly tried to do in the past."

And that's good enough for Frank. And why not? After all, the KMT has worked hard over the last half-century to become the democratic standard-bearer, untainted by corruption, that the party is today. The Democratic Progressive Party 民主進歩党, on the other hand, was trounced in the elections because of:

"...(President Chen's pushing) the envelope on Taiwan independence, by his defiance of both Beijing and Washington, and by his going so far as to remove the honor guards from the mausoleums of two late presidents, Chiang Kai-shek (Shō Kaiseki) 蒋介石 and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (Shō Keikoku) 蒋経国."

Ching has entered Gregory Clark territory with that last statement. I've read a lot of articles recently that tried to analyze why the DPP had a case of whupass opened on it in the elections, but none of them mentioned the removal of soldiers guarding the tombs of two dictators as one of the reasons. Ching then turns his attention to the presidential election:

"To be sure, Ma (Ying-jeou) (Ba Eikyū) 馬英九 is substantially ahead in the public opinion polls. But it is not beyond the realm of possibility for Frank Hsieh (Sha Chōtei) 謝長廷 to catch up. Ironically, the lopsided KMT parliamentary victory may handicap Ma since voters may want to 'balance' the political situation by giving the presidency to the DPP. This may especially be the case if voters in the next two months see the KMT abusing its parliamentary majority. For that reason, Ma has emphasized that the KMT should maintain a low profile and not seek to impeach the president or amend the constitution, even though it can now do these things if it wants to."

Take a look at that last remark. The KMT now has the power to "impeach the president or amend the constitution". It may lie low for the next two months, but what will happen after March 22, especially if Hsieh wins the presidency? Well, Ching does reassure us that the KMT won't flaunt its power, and besides:

"If a Hsieh presidency should emerge, Taiwan will once again be gridlocked, with the presidency in the hands of the DPP and the parliament controlled by the KMT. The situation may not be as bad as before, since a Hsieh administration is likely to be much more moderate than the Chen administration. But it would still be bad. It would be much better for Taiwan if there was a clean sweep, with the KMT being restored to executive power. And when a Ma administration is formed, as is likely, it should seek to depoliticize Taiwan. The Chen administration has gone much too far in politicizing everything, from ethnicity to textbooks, in its attempts to rid Taiwan of any connection with China. It is time for Taiwan to get back to business and let politics take the back seat. This is in the interest of all concerned — of the political parties, of Beijing, of Washington and, most of all, it is in the interest of the people of Taiwan."

I didn't think it was possible, but Frank Ching has managed to outdo Gregory Clark. It would be much better if the KMT controlled both the presidency and the legislature? The same party that, under the Chiangs, ruled Taiwan with an iron fist for decades, and sent tens of thousands of people on this island to early graves? And the Ma administration is likely to depoliticize Taiwan? Has Frank Ching ever visited Taiwan? If he has, did he ever notice how every town on this island has streets named after Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen (Son Bun) 孫文, for example? The KMT politicized most aspects of daily life in Taiwan during its long, single-party autocratic rule, right down to the choice of the plum blossom 梅 as the national flower. If anything, Chen has attempted to depoliticize things here, by removing some of the KMT's original heavy-handed measures that were aimed at eliminating any sense of a Taiwanese identity. But Ching isn't concerned with that. After all, he thinks it's in the best interests of everyone here to sit back and trust the KMT to run the whole show from March 22. I just hope the voters don't feel the same way.

In the news ニュース

I guess the bar for membership in the Pacific Forum CSIS, some kind of think tank based in Hawaii, must be set pretty low. At least that's how it seems, judging by the article that appeared in the Japan Times today ("How Ma's 'three nos' policy could impact cross-strait ties"), and authored by none other than the research institute's president, Ralph Cossa. For chrissake, I graduated from college 20 years ago with a political science degree, and have done nothing professionally with it since, yet I could have come up with a better analysis than Cossa's:

"Nationalist Party 中国国民党 (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou (Ba Eikyū) 馬英九 has proclaimed a 'three nos' policy — no unification, no independence, no use of force — in outlining his planned approach to cross-strait relations should he win the March 22 Taiwan presidential election. This is a clever take-off on China's long-standing 'three nos': no Taiwan independence; no 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan'; and no Taiwan membership in organizations where statehood is required. Ma's construct is much more thoughtful and positively oriented; it appears aimed at reassuring three main audiences: the people of Taiwan, China, and the United States and international community in general."

No, Ralph, there's nothing at all "clever" about Ma's "policy". All he has done is to proclaim the status quo that has existed between China and Taiwan for several decades. It gets worse:

"Ma's first 'no'...serves several important purposes. It aims first to reassure those at home who fear that if Ma were elected, he would somehow 'hand over Taiwan's sovereignty' to China. Nothing Ma has ever said would lead one to believe this is his intention. Just as it has proven impossible for current President Chen Shui-bian (Chin Suihen) 陳水扁 to unilaterally make Taiwan officially 'independent,' absent support from the people and legislature, it would be equally impossible for Ma to officially and unilaterally turn Taiwan into a Chinese province, even if he wanted to. Nonetheless, fears and accusations persist, even among those who should know better. Hence the domestic importance of the 'no unification negotiations' pledge."

Apparently Ralph is unaware that legislative elections were recently held in Taiwan, and that the KMT won an overwhelming majority of seats. The Kuomintang (Guomindang), in fact, is only four votes short of commanding the two-thirds majority in the legislature needed to rewrite the constitution. Ralph also seems ignorant of that fact that, for 40 years, the KMT maintained martial law on Taiwan under an authoritarian regime that imprisoned, tortured and murdered tens of thousands of people, which might just explain why those "fears and accusations persist". Cossa then moves on to Ma's next pledge:

"His second pledge, 'no pursuit of de jure independence,' is aimed first and foremost at Beijing, although the message is equally welcomed in Washington and around the globe. Moves toward independence, like beauty, are clearly in the eye of the beholder, but few would argue that Chen has taken a long (and continuing) series of steps that seem aimed at stretching to the limit (if not beyond) his own 'no independence' pledge. Both China and the international community would welcome an end to what often appears to be a deliberately provocative game of chicken by the current Taiwan administration."

Here Ralph uses a fancy phrase like "de jure デ・ジュリ independence", but overlooks the fact that Taiwan has been in just such a state ever since the KMT fled to the island at the end of the Chinese Civil War 国共内戦 in 1949. There are still 23 nations at last count that recognize the Republic of China 中華民国 as an independent state, while much of the rest of the world allows the ROC to maintain unofficial embassies in their countries, and accepts ROC passports from Taiwanese visitors. Taiwan is also permitted to participate in a number of international organizations, even if it is under ridiculous monikers like "Chinese Taipei" チャイニーズタイペイ. If all this isn't "de jure", then I don't know what is. Of course, if Ma, the public face of a party that officially believes in "reunifying" Taiwan with China, also denies Taiwan's de facto nationhood, then Cossa's assertion that:

"...talk about reunification remains premature. In truth, nothing short of a remarkable complete political transformation on the mainland will ever make reunification attractive to the people of Taiwan."

isn't so reassuring after all. A political party with an authoritarian past that would control both the presidency and the legislature is a party that might not need concern itself with what the people think is attractive. Nonetheless, Ralph thinks he recognizes "reality":

"Let's be realistic: China will never give an unconditional 'no use of force' pledge. Beijing realizes that the primary deterrent to Taiwan moving toward de jure independence is fear of the possible consequences. It is unlikely to give up this important leverage. But it is not too much to challenge Beijing, after the Taiwan presidential election, to make a conditional no-use-of-force pledge; namely, that 'as long as the Taiwan authorities do not take steps toward de jure independence, China will remain completely committed to a peaceful resolution to the cross-strait issue.' This is, in fact, consistent with China's current stance and also with the (Anti-Secession Law 反分列国家法) . It would set a positive tone for the future development of cross-strait relations, especially if accompanied by a freeze or (preferably) reduction in the number of Chinese missiles currently pointed toward Taiwan. In keeping with the 'no use of force' pledge, the new Taiwan administration might also want to give serious consideration to scrapping its own offensive missile program."

I'm obviously no foreign policy "expert" like Ralph Cossa. I don't have his B.A. in international relations from Syracuse University, his M.B.A. from Pepperdine University, and his M.S. in strategic studies from the Defense Intelligence College. But how is it I have trouble reconciling China's so-called "commitment to a peaceful resolution to the cross-strait issue" with its deployment of over 900 ballistic missiles pointed at Taiwan, (even though, as Ralph writes, "No one loses much sleep worrying about a Taiwan attack on the mainland.")? In fact, Ralph doesn't say much about Chinese missiles other than there should be a freeze or reduction, but somehow seems to feel that Taiwan is upsetting the balance here with its own missile program that, in all likelihood, is still in the development/testing phase. In fact, I recall reading a year or so ago that while the Chinese had deployed over 700 missiles (numbers vary), Taiwan had all of three prototypes aimed at China! Ralph is right - no one in Beijing is losing any sleep over that threat!

Cossa closes up by reminding himself just why he is such an "expert" on international affairs:

"Let me end with a bold (although some would say unrealistic or hopelessly naive) suggestion. Chen has said that his own 'four nos' policy will end with his administration — others will say it effectively ended months, if not years ago. Regardless, ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 民主進歩党 candidate (Frank) Hsieh (Sha Chōtei) 謝長廷...has a clean slate in proclaiming his own list of assurances. Why not state, in the interest of (finally) having a bipartisan cross-strait policy, that he is also willing to endorse and adopt a similar 'no reunification, no independence, no use of force' policy?"

There's a good reason why some people would say Ralph's suggestion is unrealistic and hopelessly naive. For the past eight years, the KMT has pursued an obstructionist line towards Chen, delaying legislation, freezing or drastically cutting budgets, threatening recalls and so on. "Bipartisan" isn't a word that one would associate with the KMT's performance as the political opposition. It certainly looks like Ralph hasn't been paying much attention to Taiwan's domestic political affairs. And why is it Hsieh would have to accept Ma's proposals for there to be bipartisanship? I thought politics was the art of compromise. Ralph soldiers on:

"Such a move would help depoliticize Taiwan's most important and sensitive national security issue. It would help assure Beijing and Washington that the 'new' DPP...is genuinely determined to set a more cooperative course. It would also reinforce the shared DPP/KMT goal of increasing Taiwan's 'international breathing space,' a goal that realistically can only be accomplished with Beijing's acquiescence. It would limit the impact of the Taiwan/U.N. referendum — separate KMT and DPP versions will be voted on during the presidential elections — and also help limit Chen's options if he is tempted to try to institutionalize his own more controversial and divisive approach toward cross-strait relations either before the election or during the post-(legislative) election, pre-May 20 inauguration period."

I'm not sure what it is Ralph is afraid Chen might do to "institutionalize" things here. Rename more companies? Remove more statues of dictators? Insist on using Tongyong Pinyin 通用拼音? Finally, he writes:

"In short, it (meaning Ralph's "bold" suggestion) would serve Taiwan's, Beijing's and Washington's national security interests and create a long overdue 'win, win, win' scenario. "

Everybody wins, except those who wish Taiwan could be an independent, democratic state welcomed into the family of nations. Next week Ralph Cossa will come up with fresh, daring proposals to end the Arab/Israeli stalemate! In the meantime, I'm left wondering why I'm finding it difficult to break out of my career rut, while so-called "experts" like Ralph Cossa phone-in their simplistic, one-sided "analyses" on complex international issues without bothering to do much background research. I suppose if I had a cushy egghead position in Honolulu, I would take it easy as well!

アンバー、誕生日おめでとう！

娘は今日から２歳になっています。

　

モダンダンス

娘はイッツ・ア・スモールワールドに踊っている。

Dancing Days

Taiwan's Shinkansen in the news 台湾の新幹線

Max Hirsch has an article in today's Japan Times ジャパンタイムズ on Taiwan's high speed train, "Taiwan's Japan-made bullet trains end first year in red - but on track", a headline which says it all, as do the opening paragraphs:

"Taiwan's Japan-built high-speed trains have yet to become a cash-cow success, but neither are they the disaster critics had once predicted. As Taiwan marked the first year of the rail system on Jan. 5, bittersweet pride surely ranks high among its founders. The bitter sprouts from a fiscal shortfall as Taiwan High Speed Rail Corp. 台湾高速鉄道 seeks to dramatically boost ridership from the current 43,000 passengers daily to at least the break-even point. But the sweet is just as palpable as Taiwan's first bullet trains, which traverse 345 km between Taipei 台北 and Kaohsiung 高雄 at the island's southern tip, run without a hitch."

There were a lot of doubts about the bullet train before, as well as soon after, it started service. I remember many of my students saying at the time that they were too scared to ride it, over fears about its safety. Hirsch recalls these sentiments:

"Over budget and 16 months behind schedule, the high-speed rail system opened for business amid intense, and often negative, media attention on Jan. 5, 2007. Multiple minor derailments in test runs two months prior to the opening supplied ammunition to critics, who conjured up images of a nightmarish pileup at 300 kph, the trains' top speed. Mixing European track technology with Japanese bullet trains, they warned, was a recipe for derailment...a troubled collaboration with Taiwan Shinkansen Engineering to forge the world's first Japanese-European bullet-train system in the world's biggest build-operate-transfer project ever. The final price tag was $15 billion. As delays and cost overruns mounted, critics panned the project as a doomed, extravagant bid to integrate incompatible technologies. But the detractors are falling silent as the system turns a corner in its first year."

And things are continuing to look up:

"Boasting an impeccable safety record so far, THSR plans to increase daily trips from 113 to 176 and post profits next year...Already, a new ticketing policy is boosting passenger traffic. In November, THSR added open seating, while reducing fares by 20 percent, for seats in three train cars, a policy that saw passenger traffic jump from 1.44 million passengers in October to 2 million in December. And so popular is the policy that THSR plans to extend it indefinitely..."

I still have my doubts about the long-term viability of the shinkansen here. I'm fascinated with the technology (I've ridden the shinkansen in Japan numerous times, from Hakata 博多 to Hachinohe 八戸, and many points in between), and I wish the project success, but I wonder if Taiwan is large enough to really need such an expensive transportation system. Could that $15 billion have been spent on something less glamorous, but more vital to daily life, such as improvements to infrastructure?

Hirsch, however, remains optimistic:

"...2 million riders monthly is a far cry from what...is the 3.6 million passengers, each paying at least 1,000 Taiwan dollars (¥3,350), that THSR needs to start settling its debts and making a profit. Nonetheless, 'THSR expects to break even in the latter half of this year,' (Ted) Chia (vice president of the THSR public affairs division) said, adding the network will run 176 daily trips by then. So even though THSR is running deep in the red, its future could be bright. This year's goals...include improving ticketing systems and inducing convenience stores to serve as ticket outlets. Local personnel are meanwhile increasing as THSR internalizes its Eastern and Western technologies...Another key goal this year...is to employ 100 Taiwanese drivers as foreign drivers dwindle. Long-term plans include developing about 92 hectares of land in five 'business districts' near the line, a business opportunity for THSR as its bullet trains drive up real estate near stations...THSR manages the land under government contract. Next year, THSR plans to break ground on a 12-km extension to the Nangang 南港 District in Taipei with operations starting in 2011. Construction of three more stations on the current line will follow..."

The Daily Yomiuri ザ・デイリー読売, by the way, has an article today on how Japan's shinkansen lines are financed ("Shinkansen plans face funding woes"), which sheds light on the different approaches to building bullet train lines in Japan and Taiwan.