The 2008 Major League Baseball season has gotten underway, and here in Taiwan, that can only mean Wang Chien-ming 王建民. While Wang is certainly a good pitcher (even if he does ply his trade with the hated New York Yankees), it's nice to see other Taiwanese players get some notice in the media. The Daily Yomiuri ザ・デイリー読売 has an article in its sports section today on a game last night between the Chūnichi Dragons 中日ドラゴンズ and the (hated) Yomiuri Giants 読売ジャイアンツ, and the headline says it all: "Chen sends Yomiuri to worst start". "Chen" is Chen Wei-yen 陳偉殷 (or チェン as he known on the Dragons roster), who earned his first victory after four years playing in Japan, and recovering from elbow surgery. The newspaper summarizes the game thusly:
"A Chunichi pitcher who had little time to get warm kept Yomiuri ice cold as the Dragons blanked the Giants 3-0 on two hits at Tōkyō Dome on Wednesday. Chen Wei-yen came on in the second inning in relief of injured starter Masahiro Yamamoto and tossed 5-2/3 shutout innings to send the defending Central League champions to a franchise-worst fifth-straight loss to open the season."
There are several other players from Taiwan in both MLB and Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB). I hope we can hear more about them, and a little less about Wang, this year. Fat chance of that happening, though.
The Japan Times ジャパンタイムズ has an all-together more serious article on Taiwanese politics in its commentary section. Entitled (without any hint of sarcasm or irony) "Taiwan politics: Back to the good old days under the KMT", it's yet another analysis of the presidential election. Ah, back to the days of martial law, and imprisonment, torture and executions of political prisoners? Not according to one Denny Roy, of the East-West Center in Honolulu:
"Surprises and exciting finishes are the rule in Taiwan's elections. In the months before the presidential election on March 22, Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou led Democratic Progress Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh Chang-ting in public opinion polls by as much as 20 percent, but the gap appeared to be shrinking as the vote approached...When the votes were in, however, the result was a resounding 16 percentage point victory for Ma. Why did he win by such a large margin? The DPP claims it is because the KMT has disproportionate influence over Taiwan's media (some even believe China helps finance Blue-oriented media outlets). This would help explain what Ma's critics call his 'Teflon man' quality — the damage caused by his mistakes has made relatively little impact. To other observers, the largest single factor in Ma's victory appeared to be public dissatisfaction with incumbent DPP President Chen Shui-bian's performance, particularly the weak economy that has plagued Taiwan through most of his presidency. Chen's implication in a corruption scandal, for which he may face prosecution after he leaves office, also hurt, as it undermined the DPP's long-standing effort to present itself as a clean alternative to an allegedly corrupt KMT. The 'one party domination' argument may have been negated by the public's weariness with the divided government that prevailed during the Chen years and often obstructed much-needed legislation."
For a man who has written a book on Taiwanese politics, it's rather curious that Roy fails to mention that it was obstructionism on the part of the KMT that led to the legislative gridlock cited above. Later on in the article, he writes:
"Taiwan's relatively low level of defense spending and unwillingness to pay for the arms package Washington offered in 2001 created among many Americans a suspicion that Taiwan was a defense free-rider. Ma has already begun to heal the rift. Harvard-educated and fluent in English, he made a favorable impression during a visit to America in 2006. The KMT is apparently interested in purchasing another batch of F-16 fighters. And Ma has committed to raising Taiwan's defense spending to 3 percent of the country's gross domestic product."
And again Roy omits to mention that it has been the KMT that has held up the arms purchase package. He also glides over the fact that Ma, on that 2006 US visit, promised to get moving on the arms sale as soon as he got back to Taiwan, a pledge that was never kept.
Roy does make some good points in his commentary:
"...DPP campaigners relied on a 'conversion strategy' that emphasized a shrill and divisive message: voting DPP is the only defense against Taiwan being sold out to China. The fact that many native Taiwanese voted for Ma proves that this narrow definition of patriotism has limited appeal. Ma even won in Kaohsiung, a southern Taiwan city where Hsieh served as mayor and a traditional DPP stronghold. The latest round of referendums was a minor disaster, ruined by partisanship. The exercise was dubious from the beginning. Asking the people of Taiwan if they want membership in the United Nations under the name 'Taiwan' made little sense except as a tactic to use Taiwan nationalism to mobilize supporters of the DPP on election day. As a counterweight, the KMT sponsored its own similar U.N. referendum, giving voters the opportunity to choose whether they would like to join the U.N. under the name 'Taiwan' or 'Republic of China.' In fact, the premise was a complete fantasy offered to date have reached that threshold. In this case the competing referendums proved counterproductive. China's Taiwan Affairs Office misconstrued the result, announcing that 'the issue of independence has not won the heart of the Taiwanese people.' Yet even without China's bias, foreign observers might reach the false conclusion that Taiwan's people do not want to join the U.N."
The UN referendum pushed by the DPP was a pointless exercise that both took attention away from the presidential campaign, and needlessly riled countries like the US that Taiwan must rely on (even if the former overreacted in this case).
However, in the rest of the article, Roy reverts to a tired analysis that only looks at things from a Chinese point of view:
"Ma supports the 'one China' principle, which Beijing has said will clear the way for a resumption of cross-strait talks...Ma also favors expanded cross-strait economic and social contacts, which are part of the (Chinese) strategy for peaceful unification. In short, a Ma presidency will greatly assure China that Taiwan is back on track toward politically joining China. Unless the Chinese leadership becomes overly anxious, this should greatly reduce the need to influence Taiwan through military threats."
Yes, good times are coming, if you like the idea of Chinese hegemony. However:
"One of Ma's challenges will be to improve cross-strait relations without losing domestic support; in other words, he must satisfy both the Chinese government and Taiwan society. Ma must prove himself to the over 40 percent of his countrymen who voted against him. He cannot move too quickly or too far to accommodate Beijing. To demonstrate that he is not the sellout, some in Taiwan fear Ma must carry out some policies that are inherently undesirable to Beijing. First, he will have to insist that China treat Taipei as an equal negotiating partner rather than a subordinate. Second, he will want to repair the relationship with the United States as a hedge against China."
Some people in Taiwan "fear" that a President Ma might actually have to pursue policies that favor Taiwanese interests over those of China? An interesting choice of word. Roy goes on to write:
"Beijing seems to have learned that using overt threats against Taiwan tends to bring about the opposite of the desired result. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party's understanding of democratic politics in Taiwan is suspect. Some Chinese elites may see Ma's presidency as an opportunity to push for major steps toward unification, making up for time lost since 2000. But expecting too much too soon from Ma without regard to his domestic political environment would be a mistake even in terms of China's own interests. Such impatience could set the stage for a backlash in 2012 that would return the DPP to power. Beijing must realize that it is in China's interests to give Ma enough rewards and concessions to maintain his legitimacy at home. The Chinese could not grant any leeway to a Taiwan president whom they believed was a committed 'separatist,' but they can to Ma. Some possible acts of reconciliation Beijing could offer include a freeze or withdrawal of the ballistic missiles arrayed against Taiwan, which can be easily redeployed if necessary; and acquiescence to Taiwan attaining observer status in the World Health Assembly."
It seems threats of military action against democratically-elected governments is a perfectly acceptable policy tool in Roy's analysis of Taiwan-China relations. He concludes by writing:
"Ma's presidency represents an opportunity for the transformed KMT to show how competently it can govern Taiwan, for China to show some magnanimity in cross-strait relations now that its Chen nightmare is ending, and for Taipei to rekindle the previous warmth of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. It is too much to hope that the great potential in all these areas will be fully realized, but at minimum some improvement in each is likely compared with the Chen era."
Eight years of attempting to strengthen democracy's roots in Taiwan, and of encouraging a Taiwanese identity, are dismissed in a single word: "nightmare". I worry that for the people of Taiwan, as well as those in the larger East Asia area, the "nightmare" may only just be beginning.
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